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ARTICLE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 2.0:
RECENT VOTER ID LAWS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS THEREOF
ERIN A. PENROD*
ABSTRACT
“Black lives don’t matter and neither do[ ] your votes”—graffiti
found in Durham, North Carolina on November 9, 2016, the day after Don-
ald Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United States.
Disguised as a necessary measure to protect the integrity of elections
and to avoid voter fraud, the latest form of voter suppression is requiring a
person to provide state-issued identification to vote. While the rationales
behind these laws have been largely derided as pretext, challenges to the
laws have not been particularly successful. Recently, several challenges to
voter ID laws have made their way through different federal courts with
varying results. Three types of challenges have been consistently brought:
(1) discriminatory purpose claims, (2) discriminatory effect claims, and (3)
undue burden claims. This Article analyzes the claims brought in the recent
voter ID cases and provides a legal roadmap for voter ID opponents by
demonstrating that discriminatory effect claims are the most viable claims
that can be brought. This article offers insight into more effective ways in
which voter ID opponents can attack and undermine the rationales that have
thus far been accepted as legitimate by the public and the Supreme Court.
INTRODUCTION
Voter identification (“ID”) laws, in place in most states, require some
form of identification for people to vote. Recently, several federal courts
have ruled on the constitutionality of voter ID laws, all of which have ar-
rived at varying results. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found in North
Carolina that the voter ID law was not in place to prevent voter fraud issues
* J.D. I would like to thank Professor Nancy Leong for her guidance and Professor Justin
Pidot for his support. Thanks also to the editing team at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal
for their dedication and assistance.
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as the Republican-led state legislature had purported, but was unabashedly
designed to prevent minority voters, who overwhelmingly vote Democrat,
from voting. Yet, when reviewing the voter ID law in Virginia, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the law was not enacted with discrimi-
natory intent, nor did it have a discriminatory effect. Though the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals did not find that the Texas legislature had a
discriminatory intent when enacting its voter ID law, it did find that the law
had a discriminatory effect in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Wisconsin’s voter
ID provision was not enacted with discriminatory intent nor did it have a
discriminatory effect, while a later ruling of a district court found that a
different provision of Wisconsin’s voting-restriction laws was enacted with
discriminatory intent and found other aspects had a discriminatory effect.
The purported reasons for enacting these laws were the same in each of the
cases: to prevent voter fraud and to protect the integrity of elections. The
courts’ inconsistent findings, despite the consistency of the stated purposes
of the laws, reflect the law’s varying harshness.  And, when evaluating the
laws relative to the individual states’ histories and legislative actions, the
decisions highlight the courts’ skepticism.
Part I provides a brief history of minority disenfranchisement in the
United States and the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the
“VRA”).1  It then discusses the Supreme Court’s later gutting of the VRA
and how this decision paved the way for the proliferation of voter ID laws
around the country. Part I will also describe other aspects of structural dis-
enfranchisement, including voter dilution and mass incarceration’s concom-
itant felon disenfranchisement laws. Part II delineates the rise of voter ID
laws and their baseless rationales, the Supreme Court ruling which allows
these rationales to flourish unchecked, and the real effects of the voter fraud
myth. Part III presents a detailed overview of the four federal cases that
have recently ruled on the legality of the voter ID laws in North Carolina,
Texas, Wisconsin, and Virginia. Part III examines the three types of claims
that have been brought: discriminatory purpose, discriminatory effect, and
undue burden. Part IV considers the successes and failures of the analytical
frameworks and concludes with lessons learned and a prediction of how
these cases will affect various aspects of future voter ID law cases.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301 to 10702 (2012)).
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I. DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA
A. The Original Electorate, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow
Black disenfranchisement in America began in 1619 when the first Af-
rican slaves arrived in Virginia.2 For the next 250 years, most black Ameri-
cans were enslaved and therefore could not vote; neither could most
freedmen.3 The original Constitution did not affirmatively state who would
comprise the electorate, leaving the question to the states to decide.4 Most
states relied on the existing English framework to determine voter eligibil-
ity, meaning property ownership was determinative: one had to be a “real
landowner or possess at least 300 to 500 dollars in personal property” to
vote.5 Early state legislatures reasoned that because property owners felt the
effects of state laws, they should be allowed to vote, and such men would
be able to effectively represent those without property.6 Under this scheme,
voting was decidedly a privilege, not a right.
Following the Civil War, Congress passed the three Reconstruction
amendments: the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery; the
Fourteenth Amendment, which defined citizenship to include blacks and
prohibited states from passing laws that would “abridge the privileges or
immunities” of citizens or deny them “equal protection of the laws”; and
the Fifteenth Amendment, which explicitly prohibited the denial or abridg-
ment of the right to vote on racial grounds.7 Because these amendments
“merely prohibited express racial discrimination commands and did not
guarantee the right to vote,” states were left with enough leeway to create
“socioeconomic and other barriers to the full and free exercise of the
franchise.”8
The former Confederate states were the first to implement systematic
voting restrictions as a way to disenfranchise black voters.9 Southern states
began adopting “poll taxes, cumulative poll taxes (demanding that past as
well as current taxes be paid), literacy tests, secret-ballot laws, lengthy resi-
dence requirements, elaborate registration systems, [and] confusing multi-
2. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MI-
NORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (Bernard N. Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992).
3. Id.
4. Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price
of Democracy, 86 DENV. L. REV. 1023, 1037–1038 (2009).
5. Id. at 1038.
6. Id.
7. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 69, 71, 82 (rev. ed. 2009). The Reconstruction Act of 1867 required for
readmission into the Union that confederate states ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and alter their
state constitutions to extend black men the right to vote. Id. at 73; see also U.S. CONST. amends.
XIII, XIV, XV.
8. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1040.
9. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 88.
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ple voting-box arrangements.”10 Though the intent of such laws were
obviously discriminatory, the courts considered them neutral and therefore
fair, as the laws did not explicitly discriminate against African Americans.11
So long as the state legislatures gave a reasonable rationale for such laws,
such as the “fair administration” of elections, courts considered them con-
stitutionally sound.12 This explanation, that such voting requirements were
needed to protect the integrity of elections, continues to be used to justify
voting restrictions today. Courts did not look at a state’s recent history or a
law’s legislative history to detect racial animus for these laws; thus, white
lawmakers were explicit in their goals of rewriting state constitutions or
passing state statutes.13 For example, at Virginia’s 1901 Constitutional Con-
vention, R. L. Gordon declared, “I intend[ ] . . . to disfranchise every negro
that I [can] disfranchise under the Constitution of the United States, and as
few white people as possible.”14 The voter suppression laws worked: in the
South, post-Reconstruction voter-turnout levels of “60 to 85 percent fell to
50 percent for whites and single digits for blacks.”15
B. The Voting Rights Act
Due to limited federal legislative action, changes to voting rights re-
strictions were accomplished on a piecemeal basis.16 Though three civil
rights acts were passed in 1957, 1960, and 1964, they were limited;17 it was
the violent repression of nonviolent civil-rights activists that kept black dis-
enfranchisement at the forefront of the American consciousness.18 On Au-
gust 6, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the VRA.
Section 2 is a permanent feature of the VRA that prohibits the imposi-
tion of voting standards, practices, or procedures that deny or abridge any
citizen’s right to vote on account of race or color.19  In City of Mobile v.
10. Id. at 89. To still allow poor and illiterate whites to vote, however, state legislatures
enacted grandfather clauses, which allowed those who could vote before 1867 and those whose
father or grandfather could vote before 1867 to skip the tests and taxes. Grandfather Clause,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/grandfather-clause.
11. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1041.
12. Id. at 1043.
13. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 90. Years prior, rich whites would not have been concerned
about disenfranchising poor whites along with blacks, but in southern states post-Civil War, it was
imperative that political division did not occur along class lines, but rather along race lines to
ensure that rich whites retained political, social, and economic control. Id. at 85.
14. Id. at 91.
15. Id. at 92.
16. Id. at 189–90 (noting that political efforts focused on eliminating the poll tax were
largely failed, save for a few scattered victories).
17. Id. at 208–211.
18. Id. at 207.
19. Voting Rights Act § 2. Section 2 has since been revised to include certain language mi-
nority groups.
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Bolden,20 the Supreme Court held that Section 2 simply restated the Fif-
teenth Amendment and thus a plaintiff would need to prove that any stan-
dard, practice, or procedure was enacted or maintained in part by an
invidious purpose.21 However, Congress swiftly responded to the Court’s
holding in Mobile by enacting the 1982 amendments to the VRA, which
made clear that a plaintiff could establish a violation of Section 2 if the
“totality of the circumstances of the local electoral process” demonstrates
that “the standard, practice, or procedure being challenged had the result of
denying a racial or language minority an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process.”22 Thus, a plaintiff challenging a voting-restriction
law under Section 2 may bring two claims: (1) that the law was enacted
with a racially discriminatory purpose,23 or (2) that the law has a racially
discriminatory effect.24 At the same time, the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary issued a report suggesting factors for courts to consider when deter-
mining whether a law has a racially discriminatory effect.25 These factors
(the “Gingles factors”) were endorsed by the Supreme Court in Thornburg
v. Gingles.26
Sections 4 through 9 of the VRA are special provisions that require
congressional reauthorization every five years, which Congress had done
consistently.27 Section 4’s coverage formula is used to make the statute ap-
20. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 135, as recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 35 (U.S. 1986).
21. Id. at 60–61.
22. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/
section-2-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
23. Id. Plaintiffs claiming that such laws were enacted with discriminatory purpose may also
bring claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
24. Id.
25. S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 28–29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 186. These factors include: “(1) the history of official voting-related discrimi-
nation in the state or political subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state [or] political
subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for dis-
crimination against [a] minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority-voting
requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; (4) the exclusion of members of [a] minority
group from candidate-slating processes; (5) the extent to which minority group members bear the
effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinders their
ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals
in political campaigns; and (7) the extent to which members of [a] minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Id. Two additional considerations are: (1) whether there
is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
the members of the minority group; and (2) whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or pro-
cedure is tenuous.” Id. [hereinafter Gingles Factors]. These factors are not exhaustive and will not
be relevant in every case, nor must a certain number of factors be proven or point one way or the
other. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 97–417, at 29).
26. 478 U.S. at 44–45.
27. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 212.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 6 16-APR-18 8:05
212 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
plicable in instances where a state used any test or device28 as a voting
prerequisite and had a voter registration rate of less than fifty percent of the
voting-age residents on November 1, 1964.29 If triggered, the Act would
immediately abolish any such tests or devices.30 The day after the Act went
into effect, tests were suspended in seven states entirely and in many indi-
vidual counties elsewhere.31 Under Section 5, changes in election practices
or procedures were frozen in states or counties that were implicated by the
coverage formula in Section 4.32 Changes to the covered jurisdictions’ vot-
ing laws could only go into effect after the U.S. Attorney General or the
District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the changes had
neither discriminatory purpose nor effect.33
In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder34 the United States Supreme
Court held that it is unconstitutional to use the formula in Section 4 of the
VRA to determine the jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement
of Section 5.35 The Court relied on the principle of “equal sovereignty,”
which holds that “by virtue of the sovereignty acquired through revolution
against the Crown, . . . [each] State acquired similar rights as an inseparable
attribute of the equal sovereignty guaranteed to it upon admission” into the
United States.36 The VRA, on its face, departs from this principle and the
Court emphasized that such a departure can be justified only if there is a
showing that a “statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently re-
28. A “test or device” includes “any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or
registration for voting (1) demonstrates the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any
matter, (2) demonstrates any educational achievement of his knowledge of any particular subject,
(3) possesses good moral character, or (4) proves his qualification by the voucher of registered
voters or members of any other class.” Voting Rights Act § 4(c). Note that this does not include
poll taxes. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, passed in 1964, declared poll taxes in federal elec-
tions unconstitutional, but there was still debate as to whether poll taxes were unconstitutional at
the state level. Thus, though Congress did not include poll tax as a “device” in Section 4, Con-
gress did permit the attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of state poll taxes. Id. at
§ 10. Poll taxes in state elections were declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in 1966. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
29. Voting Rights Act § 4.
30. Id.
31. Davidson, supra note 2, at 18.
32. About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). Sections 6, 7,
and 8 gave the attorney general the power to appoint voting “examiners” that could be sent to
covered jurisdictions to ensure that people eligible to vote could register and vote. Voting Rights
Act §§ 6–8. Fifteen percent of the one million new minority citizens registered in the first ten
years following the Act are directly attributed to the examiner program. Davidson, supra note 2, at
20.
33. Voting Rights Act § 5. Section 5 is frequently referred to as the “preclearance
requirement.”
34. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) abrogating Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
35. About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 32. The previously covered jurisdic-
tions no longer face preclearance requirements unless ordered by a court under Section 3(c). Id.
36. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960); see also Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2623.
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lated to other problems it targets.”37 The opinion, which began ominously
by stating that the VRA “employed extraordinary measures to address an
extraordinary problem,”38 ended with the conclusion that now, nearly fifty
years later, there is no extraordinary problem calling for extraordinary mea-
sures.39 The Court found that in covered jurisdictions “[v]oter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of
federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprece-
dented levels.”40 The Court found that the “current need[ ]” to ensure that
state voting laws have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect no longer
justified the “current burdens” of the VRA.41 Thus, the Court held that the
Section 4 coverage formula is unconstitutional.42 As a result, Section 5,
which relied on Section 4’s coverage formula to subject states to
preclearance requirements, became effectively void. Because Section 5 no
longer blocks or deters discriminatory voting changes, several states imme-
diately took action that otherwise likely would have been blocked by Sec-
tion 5.43 A common feature in this flurry of voter restriction legislation is a
voter ID requirement.44
C. Modern Forms of Disenfranchisement
1. Vote Dilution
Recent voter ID laws are modern iterations of historical disen-
franchisement laws designed to prevent black and other minority Americans
from voting. “There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a
piece of paper and drop it in a box. . . . The right to vote includes . . . the
37. Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (citing Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
38. Id. at 2618.
39. Id. at 2625.
40. Id. (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 202).
41. Id. at 2627.
42. Id.
43. Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 5,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-Supreme-Court-ruling-states-rush-to-
enact-voting-laws.html.
44. Kim Chandler, Alabama Photo Voter ID Law to be Used in 2014, State Officials Say,
AL.COM (June 26, 2013), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/06/alabama_photo_voter_id_law_to.html
(reporting that after the Shelby decision, Alabama moved ahead with the photo ID law that was
passed in 2011 but was never submitted for preclearance to go into effect); N.C. Lawmakers Back
Voter ID Law, POLITICO (July 26, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/north-carolina-
voter-id-094788 (reporting that shortly after the Shelby decision, the North Carolina legislature
passed a law that imposed a strict photo ID requirement, among other things); Ed Pilkington,
Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law after Supreme Court Decision, GUARDIAN (June 25,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/25/texas-voter-id-supreme-court-decision (re-
porting that officials in Texas vowed to immediately implement a new controversial voter ID law
within hours of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby); Voting Rights Act Ruling
Clears Path for Mississippi Voter ID Use in 2014, GULFLIVE.COM (June 25, 2013), http://
blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2013/06/voting_rights_act_ruling_clear.html.
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right to have the vote counted at full value without dilution or discount.”45
Vote dilution, the process by which election laws or practices “combine
with systemic bloc voting among an identifiable majority group to diminish
or cancel the voting strength of at least one minority group,”46 is a form of
disenfranchisement, distinct from outright vote denial, that persists to this
day despite Section 2 of the VRA’s vote dilution cause of action.47
Vote dilution was especially visible in the recent presidential election,
in which the president was elected by the Electoral College.48 Most states
provide that “the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in the
state claims all of its electoral votes.”49 Under this system, the votes of
minority voters who have a presidential preference that differs from the
majority, as is frequently the case in Southern states, go virtually un-
counted.50 Thus, although Hillary Clinton won the popular vote of the 2016
presidential election by almost 3 million votes,51 because she did not win
the state-specific popular votes in enough states with high electoral-college
votes, she will not be the president; the Electoral College scheme rendered
the votes of those almost 3 million Americans meaningless. Like many “ba-
roque constitutional apparatus,”52 the inclusion of the Electoral College in
the Constitution can be explained by slavery.53
2. Mass Incarceration
Another form of modern disenfranchisement is mass incarceration and
“the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those la-
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964) (quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276,
279 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
46. Davidson, supra note 2, at 24. Gerrymandering and multimember election systems are
two of the most recognizable forms of voter dilution. Id.
47. Voting Rights Act § 2. Because Section 5 can only be applied to covered jurisdictions as
defined by Section 4, it is unlikely that a voter dilution claim can be brought under Section 5.
48. Ed. O’Keefe, With electoral college vote, Trump’s win is official, WASH. POST (Dec. 19,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-electoral-college-is-poised-to-pick-trump-de
spite-push-to-dump-him/2016/12/19/75265c16-c58f-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html.
49. Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electo-
ral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935, 936 (1996).
50. Id.; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 260 (referring to the 2000 presidential election,
Keyssar notes that “Americans were reminded that, in presidential elections, the breadth of the
right to vote did not mean that all votes counted equally and that, consequently, the candidate that
received the largest number of votes would not necessarily gain office.”).
51. Nick Wing, Final Popular Vote Total Shows Hillary Clinton Won Almost 3 Million More
Ballots Than Donald Trump, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/entry/hillary-clinton-popular-vote_us_58599647e4b0eb58648446c6.
52. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 260.
53. Akhil Reed Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists, TIME (Nov. 10,
2016, 2:19 PM) (explaining that at the Philadelphia convention, James Madison recognized that
Southern states would not go for a direct national presidential election because the North would
outnumber the South, whose many slaves could not vote; thus, James Madison instead proposed
that slaves would count—not fully, of course—in computing the share of Electoral College votes),
http://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-history-slavery/; see also Paul Finkelman, The Pro-
Slavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1145 (2002).
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beled criminals both in and out of prison.”54 Upon release, former felons
find themselves subject to “legal discrimination and permanent social ex-
clusion” due to their status as felons—which affects voting, employment,
housing, education, public benefits, and jury service.55 Forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia prohibit inmates from voting while incarcer-
ated for a felony offense; thirty-three of those states extend voting restric-
tions past prison time to include parole, probation, or a post-sentence
period.56 As a result, an estimated 6.1 million Americans could not vote in
2016 due to voting restrictions based on their status as felons.57 Research
indicates that a large number of close elections would have yielded a differ-
ent outcome if felons had been allowed to vote.58 Felons are most fre-
quently black and brown men, not because people of color commit more
crimes, but because discrimination is endemic to the criminal-justice sys-
tem—from stops, to arrests, to pleadings, to sentencing.59 Felon disen-
franchisement laws have been instrumental in developing what has been
referred to as a “caste system”60 or “tiered personhood”61 with felons occu-
pying the bottom rung.
II. THE ORIGINS AND RATIONALES OF VOTER ID LAWS
Voter ID laws, another form of modern disenfranchisement, require a
person to produce a form of official ID to vote or register to vote. As of
2016, thirty-two states require a voter at a polling place to produce an iden-
tification document before casting a ballot,62 yet as many as eleven percent
of eligible voters do not have a government-issued photo ID,63 a percentage
54. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 13 (2010).
55. Id. at 13, 144–61.
56. Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT (May 10,
2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/.
57. Id.
58. ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 161 (citing Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic
Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 777 (2002)).
59. Id. at 104–109.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Atiba R. Ellis, Tiered Personhood and the Excluded Voter, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463,
464 (2015).
62. ERIC A. FISCHER & R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE VOTER IDENTIFI-
CATION REQUIREMENTS: ANALYSIS, LEGAL ISSUES, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 7 (Oct. 21,
2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42806.pdf.
63. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ POS-
SESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 3 (Nov. 2006),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39242.pdf.
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that is even higher for senior citizens,64 low-income voters,65 and people of
color.66
Voter ID laws are overwhelmingly proposed and passed by Republi-
can-majority legislatures,67 who were spurred into action by the fiasco that
was the 2000 presidential election and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bush v. Gore.68 Many politicians came to realize that “[i]n a very close
election, the rules of the game matter.”69 Efforts to enact voter ID laws
increased in 2008,70 though it is unclear whether the increase was in re-
sponse to “the election of the first black president or the record levels of
turnout of young voters and voters of color,”71 who traditionally vote for
Democrats,72 or both. Republicans introduced state and federal legislation
that would require voters to present valid government-issued IDs to prevent
fraud and to protect the integrity of American elections.73 Lawmakers
pushed for these laws despite the fact that many states already had multiple
ways in which voters could identify themselves on election day, including
utility bills, paychecks, ID cards, and affidavits.74 Republican politicians
insisted, however, that this threadbare approach made voter fraud much too
easy and much too tempting: “[a]n imposter could turn up at a polling
place, pretend he was someone else, and cast a ballot . . . . Even more
devious imposters could generate phony utility bills.”75 Republicans main-
tained that photo IDs would solve this issue and restore confidence in
American elections.
Pinpointing exactly what type of voter fraud the Republican legislators
were concerned about is an important step in uncovering their actual mo-
tives for advocating for voter ID laws. Voter ID law proponents are con-
cerned with imposters, whether that involves double voting, the
impersonation of a dead person, or, as alleged this past presidential election
64. Id. (finding that eighteen percent of citizens over the age of sixty-five lack photo
identification).
65. Id. (finding that fifteen percent of voting age citizens earning less than $35,000 lack
photo identification).
66. Id. (finding that twenty-five percent of African American voting age citizens lack photo
identification).
67. Rhode Island is the sole state in which a voter ID law was passed by a Democratic
legislature. Simon Van Zuylen-Wood, Why Did Liberal African-Americans in Rhode Island Help
Pass a Voter ID Law?, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 6, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/100429/
rhode-island-voter-id-laws-hispanic.
68. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
69. Oliver Roeder, Tighter Restrictions Are Losing in the Battle Over Voter ID Laws,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 3, 2016, 11:56 AM) (quoting Richard Hansen, a professor of law and
political science at the University of California, Irvine, who runs Election Law Blog), http://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/tighter-restrictions-are-losing-in-the-battle-over-voter-id-laws/.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 283.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 284.
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cycle by the president himself, non-citizens impersonating citizens.76 Voter
ID laws are effective only in preventing in-person impersonation at the
polls, an occurrence “more rare than getting struck by lightning.”77 To at-
tach an actual number to the problem, Justin Levitt’s research—as of Au-
gust 2014—found exactly thirty-one cases of voter fraud in over a billion
ballots cast since 2000—about 0.00003%, a statistically insignificant
number.78
The second rationale voter ID law proponents put forth is that such
laws will instill confidence in the fairness of the election process. However,
a 2008 survey conducted by political scientists at MIT and Columbia found
not only that public perception of voter fraud has no relationship to a per-
son’s likelihood of voting, but also that a voter’s confidence in the election
process does not increase if that voter is subject to stricter voter identifica-
tion requirements.79 Indeed, Republicans have so successfully perpetuated
the voter fraud myth that a few supporters of the Republican candidate in
the 2016 presidential election committed voter fraud to combat voter
fraud.80 Of course, Republican legislators have not limited voting restriction
laws to voter ID laws exclusively; voter ID restrictions are usually one
small part of a comprehensive voting-restriction law. As such, many states
have also limited early voting or have imposed additional requirements for
student voters.81
76. Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, THE BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 12–22
(2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/truth-about-voter-fraud (addressing these
“types” of voter fraud and more and outlining the non-frequency in which they are perpetuated);
Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 27, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/802972944532209664?lang=EN. In fact, Justin Levitt asserts that most
“voter fraud” can be traced back to a typographical error, clerical errors, or “matching” errors. Id.
at 7–8.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible
Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-voter-impersonation-
finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/?utm_term=.Ce6b784302ce; see also
Trip Gabriel, Donald Trump’s Call to Monitor Polls Raises Fears of Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2016) (“the ability to commit fraud on a scale vast enough to swing a statewide election
would require the coordination of scores of people, a possibility widely dismissed by experts”),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/us/politics/donald-trump-voting-election-rigging.html?_r=0.
79. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The
Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1738 (2008).
80. Keegan Hamilton, “Stealing” an Election: Trump Voters Keep Committing Fraud at the
Polls, VICE NEWS (Nov. 7, 2016), https://news.vice.com/story/trump-supporters-keep-committing-
voter-fraud.  (reporting that at least two Trump supporters committed voter fraud, one of whom
declared that “[t]he polls are rigged,” echoing sentiments expressed by President-elect Trump both
before and after the election).
81. Atiba R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 879, 881 (2014).
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A. Supreme Court Voter ID Precedent
The Supreme Court gave a legal foundation upon which voter ID law
advocates can build when, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,
the Court upheld an Indiana law requiring voters to show photo ID.82  In
Crawford, plaintiffs brought a facial challenge to Indiana’s voter ID law,
alleging that the law imposed an undue burden on the right to vote and thus
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.83 The Court applied the An-
derson-Burdick standard,84 which was articulated in Burdick v. Takushi.
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Under this
standard, the rigorousness of [the Court’s] inquiry into the propriety of a
state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.85
The Court elaborated that when such rights are subjected to “severe”
restrictions, the regulation must face strict scrutiny, “[b]ut when a state
election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restric-
tions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the
restrictions.”86 “However slight that burden may appear, . . . it must be
justified by relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitation.”87
First, the Court addressed the “precise” state interests put forth by the
Indiana legislature, which were, unsurprisingly, “deterring and detecting
voter fraud” and “safeguarding voter confidence.”88 Though the Court ac-
knowledged that the record contained no evidence of in-person voter imper-
sonation “actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history,” the Court
found that the prevention of voter fraud and the assurance of election integ-
rity are “neutral and nondiscriminatory [reasons] supporting the State’s de-
cision to require photo identification.”89
Second, the Court addressed the burdens “imposed on persons who are
eligible to vote but do not possess a current photo identification that com-
82. 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 187–88.
84. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428 (1992).
85. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
87. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 194–97.
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plies with the requirements of [the law].”90 One small sentence in Craw-
ford, approvingly quoted by several lower courts,91 seems to have secured
the longevity of voter ID laws: “the inconvenience of making a trip to the
[Department of Motor Vehicles], gathering the required documents, and
posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on
the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual
burdens of voting.”92 The Court acknowledged that a “somewhat heavier
burden may be placed on a limited number of persons” but found this bur-
den to be mitigated due to the option provided by the Indiana voter ID law
for voters without IDs to cast provisional ballots that will be counted if that
person “travel[s] to the circuit court clerk’s office within 10 days to execute
the required affidavit.”93 The Court found the state of Indiana’s “interest in
deterring voter fraud outweighed the plaintiffs’ speculative vote denial
claims.”94 The Court further determined that the fact that the Republicans
unanimously supported the law and Democrats unanimously opposed it was
ultimately inconsequential: “[i]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by
valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded
simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the
votes of individual legislators.”95
B. The Real Effects of the Voter Fraud Myth
Opponents of voter ID laws quickly pointed out the flawed rationale of
the laws: voter fraud is virtually nonexistent.96 It follows that if the pur-
ported reasons for a law are objectively and obviously flawed,97 it is appro-
priate to ask whether there may be an ulterior motive behind such laws. It
also follows that if legislators are unwilling to acknowledge the shakiness
of the purported rationales, the real reason is likely unpopular, sinister, un-
constitutional, or perhaps all three.
To find evidence of the actual reasons for the law, one must look to the
actual effects: voter ID laws “effectively disenfranchise large numbers of
90. Id. at 198.
91. See, e.g., Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 598 (4th Cir. 2016); Frank v.
Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745–746 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
92. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). Because Indiana law provides for free
identification cards, the direct costs of the identification cards are not included in the Court’s
burden analysis. Id.
93. Id. at 199.
94. Ellis, supra note 81, at 889.
95. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204.
96. ACLU, Fact Sheet on Voter ID Laws (May 2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/field_document/aclu_voter_id_fact_sheet_-_final.pdf; Suevon Lee & Sarah Smith, Every-
thing You’ve Ever Wanted to Know About Voter ID Laws, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 9, 2016, 8:33 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-youve-ever-wanted-to-know-about-voter-id-laws.
97. In addition, reasons put forth by Republican legislators call for expensive measures using
taxpayer dollars, a solution that flies in the face of professed Republican ideals.
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voters.”98 The demographics of voters most likely to lack valid govern-
ment-issued photo ID include senior citizens, people of color, people with
disabilities, low-income voters, and students;99 a cross-section of the popu-
lation that overall is more likely to vote Democrat.100 The voter fraud myth
is similar to Michelle Alexander’s assertion that the era of colorblindness
has allowed veiled racist rhetoric and falsities to shape policies to correct a
non-existent problem: one cannot openly seek to disenfranchise people of
color, but one can openly seek to disenfranchise criminals—which has
paved the way for bipartisan support of policies like the drug war and mass
incarceration.101 So too have the veiled racist rhetoric and falsities of voter
fraud shaped voter restriction laws. It does not seem coincidental that “this
willingness to disfranchise in the name of the ‘purity of the ballot box,’
occurred, yet again, at a moment when African Americans were gaining
some political power and immigration levels were at historic highs.”102
1. The Voter Fraud Myth Leads to Voter Intimidation
The perpetuation of the voter fraud myth has not only led to voter ID
laws that disenfranchise minority voters, but it has also encouraged citizens
to act as “‘voting vigilantes’ through so-called ‘grassroots efforts’ to police
voting practices.”103 In fact, the then Republican candidate for president
actually urged voters to “go around and watch other polling places” in the
months leading up to the 2016 election: “I hear these horror shows, and we
have to make sure that this election is not stolen from us and is not taken
away from us . . . . And everybody knows what I’m talking about.”104
98. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 284.
99. Voter ID, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/voter-id.
100. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 284 (“[M]en and women most likely to be adversely affected
. . . [are] disproportionately young, elderly, poor, and African American—which mean[s], of
course, that they [are] significantly more likely to vote Democratic than Republican.”); see also
Chandler Davidson, The Historical Context of Voter Photo-ID Laws, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 93,
93–94 (2009) (stating that the elderly and African Americans are more likely to self-identify as
Democrats); Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, Hillary Clinton Won Latino Vote But
Fell Below 2012 Support for Obama, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 29, 2016), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/29/hillary-clinton-wins-latino-vote-but-falls-below-
2012-support-for-obama/ (stating that Hillary Clinton won sixty-six percent of Latino/a voters in
the 2016 presidential election); Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions
by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/ (stating that young
adults preferred Clinton over Trump by a wide fifty-five to thirty-seven percent margin in the
2016 presidential election).
101. ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 104–109, 161.
102. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 287.
103. Ellis, supra note 81, at 882.
104. Trip Gabriel, Donald Trump’s Call to Monitor Polls Raises Fears of Intimidation, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/us/politics/donald-trump-voting-elec-
tion-rigging.html?_r=0.
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When this sentiment is directed at large crowd of nearly all white people105
by a candidate who was endorsed by former Ku Klux Klan leader David
Duke,106 the rhetoric takes on a particularly menacing tone. Indeed, this
language exacerbated “fears of intimidation of minorities inside polling
places, where their qualifications to vote could be challenged.”107 When
Donald Trump speaks about citizens who threaten democracy by “stealing
elections” (and who, therefore, are citizens unworthy of participating in the
democratic system), “[you] know what I’m talking about,” becomes “you
know who I’m taking about”: those who have been historically excluded—
African Americans and other racial and ethnic minority voters.108 Voting
vigilante groups, like Truth to Vote and Stop the Steal109 specifically direct
their policing efforts “toward minority and economically suppressed dis-
tricts.”110 Furthermore, as voter fraud is so rare, it would be virtually im-
possible for a “poll watcher” to catch voter fraud in the act; what is more
likely to occur is that their presence will convince the people most likely to
be questioned or harassed—people of color—to stay home.111
2. Voter ID Laws Have Led to Voter Misinformation
The fates of many voter ID laws were decided in the months leading
up to the 2016 election, creating confusion as to what was required to vote
in some states. Even individuals tasked with providing information to citi-
zens, such as poll workers and county clerks, incorrectly informed citizens
about these requirements. For example, a complaint filed by the Texas Civil
Rights Project alleged that poll workers in major cities across Texas were
telling voters that they could not vote without a government-issued photo
ID when, in fact, it had been determined earlier that year by a district court
judge on remand from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that voters without
a photo ID could use other forms of identification, such as a paycheck or a
105. Id.
106. Evan Osnos, Donald Trump and the Ku Klux Klan: A History, NEW YORKER (Feb. 29,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/donald-trump-and-the-ku-klux-klan-a-his
tory.
107. Trip Gabriel, Donald Trump’s Call to Monitor Polls Raises Fears of Intimidation, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/us/politics/donald-trump-voting-elec
tion-rigging.html?_r=0.
108. At another rally Donald Trump reminded voters that it is “so important that you watch
other communities, because we don’t want this election stolen from us.” Id.
109. See TRUTH TO VOTE, http://truethevote.org (last visited Jan 13, 2018); STOP THE STEAL,
https://stopthesteal.org (last visited Dec. 8, 2016) (stopthesteal.org no longer exists—it redirects
the user to Roger Stone’s website https://stonecoldtruth.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2018)).
110. Ellis, supra note 81, at 901.
111. Emma Green, The Disturbing Details of Trump’s Alleged Voter-Intimidation Efforts, AT-
LANTIC (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/poll-monitoring-
voter-intimidation-lawsuits/506078/.
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utility bill.112  In Detroit, the ACLU of Michigan accused Detroit City Clerk
Janice Winfrey of carrying out a “misinformation campaign” by “repeatedly
telling residents incorrectly that they must have an ID to vote.”113 It is diffi-
cult to determine whether such misinformation is intentional or uninten-
tional or if the misinformation occurred at the individual level or was a
failure higher up within the election system. Voter misinformation was re-
layed via a statewide campaign in Texas, where a federal district judge
found that Texas’s voter education campaign used “misleading language
that could discourage eligible voters from going to the polls.”114 Some voter
ID laws provide multiple options for what to do when a voter cannot pre-
sent valid ID, use vague or yet-undefined language, or use forms of statu-
tory construction that give poll workers wide latitude in their decision-
making with no check on their discretionary powers.115 Discretion allows
for unconscious (and conscious) biases to flourish and for history to re-
peat.116 Room for discretion allows for “the stereotype of criminalizing cer-
tain voters by forcing some citizens, but not all, to bear the burden of
proving that they are legitimate voters.”117
III. RECENT FEDERAL CASES CONCERNING VOTER ID LAWS
Four major pending cases bring challenges to voter ID laws in North
Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin, and Virginia.118 Though plaintiffs in these
cases have brought a number of claims, this section will focus roughly on
112. Andrew Schneider, Confusion Over Voter ID Spreads as Early Voting Continues, HOUS-
TON PUB. MEDIA (Oct. 27, 2016, 4:54 PM), jhttps://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/
2016/10/27/175203/confusion-over-voter-id-spreads-as-early-voting-continues/.
113. Allan Lengel, ACLU Accuses Detroit Clerk of Misinformation Campaign on Voter ID,
DETROIT DEADLINE (Nov. 7, 2016, 12:42 PM), http://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/16160/
aclu_accuses_detroit_clerk_of_misinformation_campaign_regarding_voter_id#.WEh4HKIrLeQ.
114. Andrew Schneider, Judge Rules Texas Defied Court Order on Voter ID Law, HOUSTON
PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 20, 2016, 5:59 AM), https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2016/
09/20/168854/judge-rules-texas-defied-court-order-on-voter-id-law/.
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-114 (if the ID presented is “insufficient” to verify the voter’s
identity, the poll worker may request the voter to undergo additional steps); R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-
19-24.2 (a voter’s provisional ballot will only count if the local board, at a later date, decides the
signatures match); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-3-105, 20A-4-107 (if a voter cannot provide a valid
voter ID, a county clerk may verify the identity and residence of a voter “through some other
means.”).
116. KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 89 ([In the post-Reconstructionist South], “[m]any of the dis-
enfranchising laws were designed expressly to be administered in a discriminatory fashion, per-
mitting whites to vote while barring blacks. Small errors in registration procedures or marking
ballots might or might not be ignored at the whim of the election officials; taxes might be paid
easily or only with difficulty; tax receipts might or might not be issued.”).
117. Ellis, supra note 81, at 901.
118. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); Veasey
v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016); One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896
(W.D. Wis. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-3083 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016). Election Law at Mortiz also lists Northeast Ohio Coali-
tion for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016) as an ongoing voter ID case, but at
this stage in the litigation process, the case has little to do with voter ID and thus will not be
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three types of claims that may arise: (1) discriminatory purpose claims,
which can be brought under the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth
Amendment, or Section 2 of the VRA; (2) discriminatory effect claims,
which can be brought under Section 2 of the VRA; and (3) undue burden
claims, which can be brought under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.119
The basic rubric for determining whether a law that denies the right to
vote has a discriminatory purpose is essentially the same whether it is
brought under the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, or
Section 2 of the VRA. Though there are different formulations in various
circuits, courts typically consider the five non-exhaustive factors originally
set out in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corporation120: (1) the historical background of the challenged law,
(2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged law, (3)
departures from normal procedural sequence, (4) legislative history, and (5)
the disproportionate racial impact of the challenged law.121 Discriminatory
intent need not be the “sole” or “primary” reason for enacting the law, but it
must be a “motivating factor.”122 Should the plaintiffs establish racial dis-
crimination to be a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the state to
demonstrate that the law would have been enacted even if the legislators’
motives had been pure.123 At this point in the analysis, judicial deference
“is no longer justified.”124
To prove discriminatory effect under Section 2 of the VRA in a vote-
denial claim, the plaintiffs must show under the totality of the circum-
stances: (1) that “the challenged standard, practice, or procedure imposes a
discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that mem-
bers of the protected class have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice,” and (2) “that burden must be in part caused by or linked to
social and historical conditions that have or currently produce discrimina-
tion against members of the protected class.”125 Courts typically consider
the Gingles factors to determine whether there is a sufficient causal link
discussed. Major Pending Election Cases, ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
election-law/major-pending-cases/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2016).
119. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). The
test and analysis for an undue burden claim is described in Section II.A.
120. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
121. Id. at 266–268. Some courts phrase these factors differently. Compare Veasey, 830 F.3d
at 231, with McCrory, 831 F.3d at 221–223 (considering additional factors when specifically
considering the Voting Rights Act § 2 discriminatory intent claim).
122. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–266.
123. Id. at 271 n.21.
124. Id. at 265–266.
125. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); see also Veasey, 830 F.3d at 244.
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between the disparate burden imposed by state voting law and social and
historical conditions produced by that discrimination.126
A. North Carolina
Within a month of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby, which ef-
fectively dismantled the portion of the VRA that required certain states,
including North Carolina, to obtain advanced approval before they could
make any changes to voting laws, the Republican-controlled legislature of
North Carolina passed “a strict photo-ID requirement, shaved a week off of
early voting, and cut same-day registration, preregistration, and out-of-pre-
cinct voting.”127 The NAACP challenged the law and a panel of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously struck down the law.128 The court
determined that the North Carolina General Assembly relied on racial data
to enact legislation that “restrict[ed] all—and only—practices dispropor-
tionately used by African Americans,”129 who “overwhelmingly vote for
the Democratic Party.”130 Because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the challenged provisions of the law were enacted with a racially dis-
criminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2
of the VRA, the court did not consider the plaintiffs’ remaining claims.131
As the Section 2 of the VRA and Equal Protection Clause’s discrimi-
natory-intent analyses are largely the same, courts typically do not examine
them individually, but the court did so in this case.132 The court specifically
noted that when addressing Section 2 discriminatory-intent claims, “one of
the critical background facts of which a court must take notice is whether
voting is racially polarized.”133 Racially polarized voting alone is not evi-
dence of racial discrimination, but it may motivate politicians to “entrench
126. See Gingles Factors, supra note 25.
127. Sarah Smith, 2016 Election Lawsuit Tracker: The New Election Laws and the Suits Chal-
lenging Them, PRO PUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2016, 4:39 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/2016
election-lawsuit-tracker-new-election-laws-suits-challenging-them; see also N.C. Lawmakers
Back Voter ID Law, POLITICO (July 26, 2013) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/north-caro
lina-voter-id-094788.
128. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016).
129. Id. at 230.
130. Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Appeals Court Strikes Down North Carolina’s Voter-
ID Law, WASH. POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ap
peals-court-strikes-down-north-carolinas-voter-id-law/2016/07/29/810b5844-4f72-11e6-aa14-e0c
1087f7583_story.html.
131. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219. The other claims included a Fifteenth Amendment discrimina-
tory-purpose claim, a Section 2 of the VRA discriminatory-effect claim, a First and Fourteenth
Amendment undue-burden claim, and a Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim. Id. at 214.
132. Id. at 219–233.
133. Id. at 221. “Racial polarization refers to the situation where different races . . . vote in
blocs for different candidates [than white voters].” Id. at 222 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 62 (1986)).
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themselves by targeting groups unlikely to vote for them.”134 The court
stated:
Using race as a proxy for party may be an effective way to
win an election. But intentionally targeting a particular race’s ac-
cess to the franchise because its members vote for a particular
party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose.
This is so even absent any evidence of race-based hatred and de-
spite the obvious political dynamics. A state legislature acting on
such a motivation engages in intentional racial discrimination in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act.135
To determine whether a facially neutral law is motivated by discrimi-
natory intent,136 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the factors
listed in Arlington Heights.137 The court noted that: (1) North Carolina has
a “long history of race discrimination . . . and race-based vote suppres-
sion;”138 (2) the law was enacted in the “immediate aftermath of unprece-
dented African American voter participation”139 and within a month of
being free from federal oversight that had been in effect for fifty years;140
(3) the legislature “rushed” the law through the legislative process; and (4)
though no minutes of the meetings about the law exist,141 the court could
glean discriminatory intent from the fact the legislators requested and re-
ceived racial voting data and then enacted legislation “restricting all—and
only—practices disproportionately used by African Americans.”142 Not
only did the court find that the law restricted the voting practices used dis-
proportionately by African Americans, but it also found that African Ameri-
cans were more likely to experience socioeconomic factors that may hinder
their political participation.143
134. Id. at 214.
135. Id. at 222–223.
136. Id. at 220 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252
(1977)). “Challengers need not show that discriminatory purpose was the sole or even a primary
motive for the legislation, just that it was a motivating factor.” Id. (quotation marks omitted)
(citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–266). Should a discriminatory purpose be found to be a
motivating factor, the burden shifts to the State to prove that even without the motivating factor, it
would have enacted the law anyway. Id. at 233 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–266).
137. 429 U.S. at 266–268. The factors are: (1) the historical background of the challenged
law, (2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged law, (3) departures from
normal procedural sequence, (4) the legislative history, and (5) the disproportionate racial impact
of the challenged decision. Id.
138. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 223.
139. Id. at 226.
140. Id. at 227.
141. Id. at 229 (“[T]estimony as to the purpose of challenged legislation ‘frequently will be
barred by [legislative] privilege.’”) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268)).
142. Id. at 230.
143. Id. at 218.
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The data upon which the legislature relied revealed that African Amer-
icans disproportionately: (1) lack a state-issued ID, (2) vote provisionally
and those who vote provisionally do so outside of their resident precinct, (3)
use preregistration, and (4) used early voting in both 2008 and 2012.144 In a
reverse mirror image, the North Carolina legislature required state-issued
ID and in-precinct voting and they limited preregistration and the number of
days a person could vote early from seventeen to ten.145 By limiting the
early-voting days, the North Carolina legislature did away with one of two
Sundays, a particularly important day of voting for the African American
community as “church congregations go together [to vote] after services in
what is called ‘souls to the polls.’”146 When it elaborated on its justifica-
tions for limiting early voting, the state explained that counties with Sunday
voting were “disproportionately black” and “disproportionately Demo-
cratic.”147 The court referred to this portion of the record as the closest
thing to a “smoking gun that we are likely to see in modern times,”148 as the
state’s justification for the law “hinges explicitly on . . . its concern that
African Americans, who had overwhelmingly voted for Democrats, had too
much access to the franchise.”149 The Court found that the law targeted
African Americans “with almost surgical precision” to “cure[ ] problems
that did not exist.”150
As the court was able to establish that race was a motivating factor by
considering the Arlington Heights factors, the burden shifted to the state to
demonstrate that the law would have been enacted regardless of the dis-
criminatory taint.151 Here, the court found the state’s justifications for the
law (“to combat voter fraud and promote public confidence in the electoral
system”) were meager and pretextual.152 The court did not even address the
“voter confidence” justification but noted that the “photo ID requirement
. . . is both too restrictive and not restrictive enough to effectively prevent
voter fraud.”153 In-person voter fraud is the only fraud the law addresses,
but there was no evidence that in-person voter fraud had ever occurred in
North Carolina.154 In fact, the only voter fraud of which there was any evi-
144. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216–218. The Court of Appeals relied on the fact-finding of the
district court, which despite the evidence, “entered judgment against the Plaintiffs on all of their
claims as to all of the challenged provisions.” Id. at 219. The standard to reverse a lower court’s
finding of fact is “clearly erroneous,” an exceptionally high standard. Id. at 219–220.
145. Id. at 216–217.
146. Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, The Voting Rights Acts in the Era of Jim Crow 2.0,
DEMOCRACYNOW! (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.democracynow.org/2016/8/4/the_voting_rights_
acts_in_the.
147. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 226.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 214.
151. Id. at 233.
152. Id. at 235.
153. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 235.
154. Id.
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dence was absentee voting fraud, but absentee voting was exempted from
the voter ID requirement as the legislature learned that whites, not blacks,
disproportionately use absentee voting in North Carolina.155 Though the
North Carolina Attorney General (a Democrat) did not appeal the ruling,
North Carolina’s Republican governor filed an emergency stay request with
the Supreme Court; the Court denied the request.156 This law is not the only
discriminatory action North Carolina has taken; the state violated the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act by purging voter rolls before ninety days after
an election, therefore violating the Motor Voter Act by failing to consist-
ently add voters who registered through the North Carolina Division of Mo-
tor Vehicles to the voter rolls.157
B. Texas
Texas’s voter ID law was originally passed in 2011,158 but since Texas
was one of the states subjected to federal scrutiny under Section 4 of the
VRA, the law did not receive preclearance.159 Yet, within hours of the Su-
preme Court’s Shelby decision, which had essentially voided the
preclearance requirement, Texas officials vowed to immediately implement
the 2011 voter ID law.160 The voter ID law limited the forms of acceptable
ID. All forms of ID must: (1) include a photograph, (2) not be expired for
more than sixty days, (3) and if not federally issued, must be an ID issued
by Texas’s Department of Public Safety.161 If a voter does not provide a
proper photo ID, the voter may execute an affidavit affirming that he or she
is a registered voter and then cast a provisional ballot, which is only
counted if the voter goes to the county registrar within six days of the elec-
tion with proper ID.162 A person may vote by provisional ballot without a
photo ID if he or she files an affidavit asserting either a religious objection
to being photographed or that his or her ID was lost or destroyed as a result
of a natural disaster that occurred within forty-five days of casting a
ballot.163
155. Id. at 230.
156. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 27 (2016).
157. Smith, supra note 127.
158. See Act of May 16, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 123, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 619.
159. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 138 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated 133 S.Ct. 2886
(2013); see also Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Asst. Atty. Gen., to Keith Ingram, Tex. Dir. of
Elections, at 5 (Mar. 12, 2012); Jim Malewitz, Texas Voter ID Law Violates Voting Rights Act,
Court Rules, TEXAS TRIB. (July 20, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/07/20/
appeals-court-rules-texas-voter-id/ (see graphic following the text of the article).
160. Ed Pilkington, Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law after Supreme Court Decision,
GUARDIAN (June 25, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/25/texas-voter-id-su-
preme-court-decision.
161. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 225–226.
162. Id. at 226.
163. Id.
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The law has had a tumultuous and protracted time in court, which, as
of April 2016, has cost the state of Texas 3.5 million dollars.164 An en banc
panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the voter ID law has a
discriminatory effect under Section 2 of the VRA.165 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to reweigh the
discriminatory intent factors under the Equal Protection Clause and under
Section 2 of the VRA, because the court found that the district court, using
the Arlington Heights factors,166 relied on some “infirm evidence” in con-
cluding that the law was enacted with discriminatory intent.167 The Court
found that the district court: (1) disproportionately relied upon the long-ago
legislative history of Texas’s discriminatory laws;168 (2) disproportionately
assigned the reprehensible actions of a few county officials to Texas’s en-
tire legislative body;169 (3) inappropriately relied upon contemporary exam-
ples of two redistricting cases as evidence of statewide discrimination (as
the courts in the redistricting cases did not find the legislature intentionally
discriminated);170 and (4) disproportionately relied upon stray post-enact-
ment comments by state legislators.171 However, the Court of Appeals
found that there was substantial evidence that the district court could  use to
conclude that the law was enacted with discriminatory purpose.172 There-
fore, the court remanded, asking the district court to evaluate: (1) evidence
that the law’s proponents likely knew of the disparate impact of the law but
enacted it anyway without considering any ameliorative measures;173 (2)
the numerous departures from typical procedures;174 (3) the fact that the
law is only tenuously related to the stated purpose of preventing voter
164. Malewitz, supra note 159 (see graphic following the conclusion of the article).
165. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 234–243, 265. The court also found that the voter ID law does not
impose a poll tax in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as the plaintiffs argued. Id. at
265–268.
166. Articulating them as “(1) the historical background of the decision, (2) the specific se-
quence of events leading up to the decision, (3) departures from the normal procedural sequence,
(4) substantive departures, and (5) legislative history, especially where there are contemporary
statements by members of the decision-making body.” Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 234–243.
168. Id. at 231 (finding the district court reached too far back in looking at Texas legislative
history of all-white primaries, literacy tests and secret ballots, and poll taxes, the most recent of
which was abolished in 1966).
169. Id. at 232.
170. Id. at 232–233 (first citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996); then citing League of
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 439–440 (2006)).
171. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 234.
172. Id. at 236–238.
173. Id. at 236–237 (“For instance, the Legislature was advised of the likely discriminatory
impact by the Deputy General Counsel to the Lieutenant Governor and by many legislators, and
such impact was acknowledged to be ‘common sense’ by one of the chief proponents of the
legislation.”).
174. Id. at 238 (listing some of the departures from protocol, such as Governor Perry designat-
ing the bill as “emergency legislation,” cutting floor debate time, and allowing the committee to
add provisions to the bill, contrary to the Legislature’s rules and ordinary practices).
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fraud;175 (4) the fact that the “many rationales were given for a voter identi-
fication law shifted as they were challenged or disproven by opponents”;176
and (5) that the law passed in the wake of “seismic demographic shifts” as
minority populations in Texas increased in such a way that the Republican
stronghold of political power was slipping.177
Though the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals could not affirm the district
court’s finding of discriminatory intent, the court did affirm the district
court’s finding that the law had a discriminatory effect in violation of Sec-
tion 2 of the VRA.178 The court adopted the Fourth Circuit’s two-part total-
ity of the circumstances framework179  and concluded that the Gingles
factors180 should be used to determine “whether there is a sufficient causal
link between the disparate burden imposed and social and historical condi-
tions produced by discrimination.”181 The court also approved of the use of
statistical analysis, which demonstrated a disparate impact on minority
voters.182
When weighing the Gingles factors, the court found the following fac-
tors weighed in favor of a finding that Texas’ voter ID law was racially
discriminatory under Section 2 of the VRA: (1) Texas’ history of official
discrimination, including long past discrimination and two discriminatory
redistricting plans passed by the same legislative session;183 (2) the exis-
tence of racial polarization in Texas;184 (3) racial disparities in education,
employment, housing, and transportation;185 (4) the fact that minorities are
175. Id. at 237 (stating that the record showed by testimony of an expert that Texas has histor-
ically justified poll taxes, literacy tests, and other voter suppression tactics with the race-neutral
reason of “promoting ballot integrity”).
176. Id. at 240–241.
177. Id. at 241 (citation omitted).
178. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 265.
179. Id. at 244. The plaintiff must show: (1) that “the challenged standard, practice, or proce-
dure [imposes] a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that members
of the protected class have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice,” and (2) “that burden must be in
part caused by or linked to social and historical conditions that have or currently produce discrimi-
nation against members of the protected class.” Id. (quoting League of Women Voters v. North
Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)).
180. See Gingles Factors, supra note 25.
181. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 245.
182. Id. at 252. The district court concluded that Texas’s voter ID law disparately impacted
African Americans and Hispanic registered voters based on expert testimony that revealed blacks
were 1.78 times more likely than whites to lack correct ID and Latino/as 2.42 times more likely to
lack correct ID. Id. at 251. The district court also found that the law “disproportionately impacts
the poor, who are disproportionately minorities,” relying on testimony that revealed that 21.4% of
eligible voters earning less than $20,000 per year lack proper ID, compared to only 2.6% of voters
earning between $100,000 and $150,000 per year. Id.
183. Id. at 257–258.
184. Id. at 258.
185. Id. at 259. The court found that 29% of African Americans and 33% of Hispanics in
Texas live below the poverty line compared to 12% of Anglos; 6.1% of Anglos were unemployed
compared to 8.5% of Hispanics and 12.8% of African Americans; 91.7% of Anglo 25-year-olds in
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 24 16-APR-18 8:05
230 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
disproportionately underrepresented in the state legislature and in public of-
fice;186 (5) and “Texas’[s] history of official discrimination.”187  The court
also found evidence that the legislature knew minorities would be most af-
fected by the law, and this, “coupled with [the law’s] effect on minorities in
Texas and the Legislature’s response to ameliorative amendments, demon-
strated a lack of responsiveness to minority needs by elected officials”;188
and that the law’s provisions did not meaningfully correspond to Texas’
interests in preventing voter fraud and increasing public confidence in elec-
tions.189 In evaluating Texas’s purported rationales, the court stated that:
the articulation of a legitimate interest is not a magic incantation a
state can utter to avoid a finding of disparate impact. Even under
the least searching standard of review we employ for these types
of challenges, there cannot be a total disconnect between the
State’s announced interests and the statute enacted.190
Like the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in McCrory, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the voter-fraud prevention rationale to be dubious
because there were no ID requirements for mail-in absentee voting, a form
of voting that is more conducive to fraud, but there were ID requirements
for in-person voting, a form of voting with little proven incidences of
fraud.191 Legislators also cited the possibility that undocumented immi-
grants and other non-citizens would try to vote, but—besides the fact that
there was no evidence of such a scenario occurring—the belief is at odds
with the common-sense rationale that undocumented immigrants are likely
to avoid contact with government agents.192  However, the real kicker is
that non-citizens can legally obtain a driver’s license, an accepted form of
ID.193 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, unlike the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in McCrory, addressed the voter confidence rationale, and found
that—not only was there “no credible evidence” to support the assertions
that voter turnout is suppressed due to lack of confidence in elections—but
also that the voter ID laws themselves would suppress voter turnout.194
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did
not clearly err in determining that Texas’s voter ID law had a discrimina-
tory effect on minorities’ voting rights in violation of Section 2 of the VRA
Texas have graduated from high school, compared to 85.4% of African Americans, and only
58.6% of Hispanics. Id. at 258.
186. Id. at 261–262.
187. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 257.
188. Id. at 261–262.
189. Id. at 262–264.
190. Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
191. Id. at 263.
192. Id.; see also Vivian Yee, Immigrants Hide, Fearing Capture on ‘Any Corner,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/immigrants-deportation
fears.html?mcubz=1.
193. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 263.
194. Id.
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and remanded to the district court to determine an appropriate remedy.195 A
few weeks later, Texas reached an agreement with the Department of Jus-
tice and minority rights groups, the terms of which allowed registered vot-
ers to vote without ID by signing an affidavit and providing proof of
residence in the form of a utility bill, bank statement, or paycheck.196 The
judge also ordered the state to communicate these changes to voters through
a 2.5 million dollar education campaign, but later found that Texas violated
the agreement “by using misleading language [in the campaign materials]
that could discourage eligible voters from going to the polls” and ordered
Texas to release new voter ID materials.197 Even after the court order, some
Texas election officials continued to give out incorrect information about
IDs.198
C. Wisconsin
In 2011, one year after Republicans gained control of both houses of
the state legislature and the governor’s mansion, Wisconsin’s voter ID law
was passed as the first of eight laws enacted over the next four years.199
Two cases have been filed regarding Wisconsin’s election laws, each with
varying success.
1. Frank v. Walker
In 2014, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Frank v.
Walker200 that Wisconsin’s photo ID laws did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 2 of the VRA, revers-
ing the district court’s preliminary injunction.201 The Supreme Court then
denied the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari.202 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that the law is no more burdensome than the law at issue
in Crawford, which therefore compelled the court to reject the constitu-
tional challenge.203 The court did not describe which constitutional analysis
it applied nor did it even mention the Fourteenth Amendment in the opin-
195. Id. at 265.
196. Aneri Pattani & Jim Malewitz, Texas Agrees to Weaken Voter ID Law for November
Election, TEXAS TRIB. (Aug. 3, 2016, 2:27 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/08/03/texas-
agrees-weaken-voter-id-law/.
197. Order Regarding Agreed Interim Plan for Elections, Veasey v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387 (5th
Cir. 2017) (No. 2:13-CV-00193), ECF No. 895; Order, Veasey v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387 (5th Cir.
2017) (No. 2:13-CV-00193), ECF No. 943.
198. Temporary Restraining Order, Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Callanen, No.
2016-CI-18915 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 28, 2016).
199. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 103; 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 903; 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 1273; 2011
Wis. Sess. Laws 1299; 2013 Wis. Sess. Laws 794; 2013 Wis. Sess. Laws 959; 2013 Wis. Sess.
Laws 1042; 2014 Wis. Sess. Laws 1046.
200. 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
201. Id. at 755.
202. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
203. Frank, 768 F.3d at 751.
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ion. Turning to the VRA claim, the court admitted that—though the find-
ings of the district court document a disparate outcome—“they do not show
a ‘denial’ of anything by Wisconsin as [Section 2] requires; unless Wiscon-
sin makes it needlessly hard to get photo ID, it has not denied anything to
any voter.”204 Thus, the court neatly concluded in eleven pages that, despite
the contrary findings at the district court level, Wisconsin’s voter ID laws
did not violate the Constitution or Section 2 of the VRA.205
2. One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen
In One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen,206 a case currently pend-
ing appeal in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiffs challenged
Wisconsin’s election laws under the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments as well as Section 2 of the VRA.207 The district
court judge felt compelled under Crawford and Frank v. Walker to reject
the plaintiffs’ facial challenge, but stated that: “[t]he Wisconsin experience
demonstrates that a preoccupation with mostly phantom election fraud leads
to real incidents of disenfranchisement, which undermine rather than en-
hance confidence in elections, particularly in minority communities. To put
it bluntly, Wisconsin’s strict version of voter ID law is a cure worse than
the disease.”208 The judge also warned that “Wisconsin may adopt a strict
voter ID system only if that system has a well-functioning safety net.”209
Plaintiffs in this case, like those in the cases challenging the North Carolina
voter ID law and Texas voter ID law, contended that the state legislature
intentionally discriminated against voters because of their race; however,
plaintiffs here did not bring intentional discrimination claims under the
Equal Protection Clause210 or Section 2 of the VRA. Instead, they brought
an intentional discrimination claim solely under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment,211 which still relies on principles articulated by Arlington Heights.212
The district court ultimately ruled that the voter ID provision was not moti-
vated by racial animus and thus did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment,
because: (1) the legislature’s rationales were the same as the rationales
stated in Crawford, which the Supreme Court endorsed; (2) Wisconsin’s
history with voter ID does not suggest that such laws are inherently moti-
vated by racial animus (as a voter ID law passed in 2005 garnered signifi-
204. Id. at 753.
205. Id. at 755.
206. One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016), appeal filed,
No. 16-3083 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016).
207. Id. at 902.
208. Id. at 903.
209. Id. at 904.
210. The plaintiffs likely did not bring the claim due to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Frank
v. Walker.
211. One Wis. Inst., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 917.
212. Id.
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cant bipartisan support); (3) though there is “scant evidence of actual voter
fraud in Wisconsin,” the “election integrity [rationale] provides a valid,
non-discriminatory reason for the voter ID law”; and (4) the legislature did
not entirely ignore the disparate effects of the law as the law provides that
the Wisconsin Division of Motor Vehicles must provide a free ID to any
citizen over eighteen requesting one for voting (though there have been
demonstrated difficulties with the implementation of this free ID).213 How-
ever, the court did find that another provision challenged under the Fif-
teenth Amendment, the restriction on the hours for in-person absentee
voting, had a disparate effect on African Americans and Latino/as.214 The
court found that “[t]he legislature did not act out of pure racial animus;
rather, suppressing the votes of reliably Democratic minority voters in Mil-
waukee was a means to achieve its political objective.”215 The court also
found that the justification—uniformity in voting across the state—was
“meager,” and when combined with the legislature’s real political objective,
led the court to conclude that “the legislature passed the provisions restrict-
ing the hours for in-person absentee voting motivated in part by the intent to
discriminate against voters on the basis of race,” in violation of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.216
The district court found that multiple provisions of the law had a dis-
criminatory effect in violation of Section 2 of the VRA. The district court,
unlike the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Frank v. Walker, found the
plaintiffs’ challenge to be a vote-denial claim, and thus followed the two-
step Section 2 discriminatory effect analysis used by the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits.217 First, the court determined that several of the challenged provi-
sions disproportionately burdened minority voters more than other voters,
including: (1) the inflexible residence requirement increase from ten to
twenty-eight days, because minorities are much more transient and more
likely to lack access to transportation to travel to the correct municipal-
ity;218 (2) the limitation of in-person absentee voting to one location per
municipality, narrowing the in-person absentee window to ten days, and
prohibiting clerks from offering weekend voting because minorities are
more likely to use extended weekend hours and most minorities lived in
large cities where one location would create large crowds;219 and (3) Wis-
consin’s “free ID” process because it disenfranchised otherwise qualified
213. Id. at 921–922.
214. Id. at 925.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. One Wis. Inst., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 952 (citations omitted). For the first inquiry, the
court considered both statistical analyses and comparisons of how the current laws affect minori-
ties compared to previous laws. Id. at 952–54.
218. Id. at 941.
219. Id. at 931–932.
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voters who would have to endure severe burdens to obtain an ID over
months.220
In the second step of the Section 2 vote denial claim, the court was
required to determine whether the burdens found in step one were linked to
social and historical conditions of discrimination.221 Though the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found the Gingles factors “unhelpful,”222 the dis-
trict court determined that the VRA still requires courts to examine the to-
tality of the circumstances, “which essentially comprises the same inquiries
that the Gingles factors address.”223 The court found that limiting in-person
absentee voting to one location per municipality, narrowing the window for
in-person absentee voting, and prohibiting extended weekend hours was
“linked to historical conditions of discrimination” and thus violated the
VRA.224
The plaintiffs also contended that the law violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments because it acted as an undue burden on the right to
vote, generally.225 The district court applied the Anderson-Burdick stan-
dard.226 Under this standard, a court must undertake a three-step analysis
for each challenged provision: (1) the court must “determine the nature and
severity of the burden . . . place[d] on eligible voters who cannot comply
with the new requirements”; (2) the court must identify the state’s “precise”
justification for the provision; and (3) the court must “weigh the burdens
against the state’s justifications for imposing them and then make the hard
judgment that the adversary system demands.”227
After applying the analysis to each provision of the law, the district
court found the following provisions violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments: (1) the limitation of in-person absentee voting to one location
per municipality, narrowing the window of time to do so, and prohibiting
220. Id. at 949, 913 (finding that two-thirds of those who attempted to get free IDs were
minorities, more than half of all people who attempted to get free IDs were African American, and
that African Americans and Latino/as represented eighty-five percent of all free ID denials).
221. Id. at 951.
222. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 754–755 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (as the Court of
Appeals was only hypothesizing what would occur if they considered the claim to be a vote-denial
claim, this portion of the opinion would fairly be characterized as dicta).
223. One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 958.
224. Id. at 959–960 (finding that disparities in housing, education, and employment condensed
minority groups into high-density urban areas; in-person absentee voting rules required voters in
large municipalities to travel farther and contend with larger volumes of people to vote; and lower
levels of educational attainment and employment decreased flexibility to spend time waiting to
vote).
225. Id. at 929–930. Plaintiffs challenging the North Carolina voter ID law did make the same
contention; the district court rejected the argument while the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
never addressed the argument because it found the law invalid on other grounds. No such conten-
tion was brought in the Texas voter ID case.
226. Id. at 930 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
227. Id. (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (plurality
opinion)).
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weekend voting hours;228 (2) the requirement that dorm lists be provided
for college students to provide proof of citizenship and the prohibition on
expired student IDs;229 (3) the increased residency requirement;230 (4) the
prohibition of clerks from faxing or emailing absentee ballots;231 and (5)
the free ID process.232
The court discussed the free ID process at length: a process wherein
one can only get a free ID if he or she can corroborate his or her existence
with a birth certificate, which minorities overwhelmingly lacked.233 If the
petitioner lacks a birth certificate or an acceptable alternative, “on average,
it takes five communications with the DMV after the initial application to
get an ID.”234 Of the sixty-one individuals denied a free ID, fifty-three were
minority voters.235 The court found the free ID process to be a “wretched
failure” that disenfranchised a number of qualified voters who “are over-
whelmingly African American and Latino. The [free ID provision] violates
the constitutional rights of those who must use it, and so Wisconsin must
therefore replace or substantially reform the process.”236 The court perma-
nently enjoined all of the provisions of the law that were found to be unlaw-
ful, yet voter ID misinformation continued to occur in Wisconsin after the
district court order, forcing a district court judge to order the state to con-
duct a better public information campaign within a month of the 2016
election.237
D. Virginia
Months after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down North
Carolina’s voter ID law, a different panel affirmed the district court’s find-
ings that Virginia’s voter ID law does not intentionally discriminate, have a
discriminatory effect, nor does it unduly burden the right to vote.238 The
voter ID law requires voters to present an approved form of ID, which in-
cludes: (1) a valid Virginia driver’s license, U.S. passport, or other photo
identification provided by the state or United States; (2) a valid student
228. Id. at 931–35.
229. One Wis. Inst., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 937–938.
230. Id. at 941–944.
231. Id. at 946–948.
232. Id. at 948–949.
233. Id. at 903.
234. Id.
235. One Wis. Inst., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 915.
236. Id. at 916.
237. Opinion & Order at 6–7, One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896 (W.D.
Wis. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-3083 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (No. 15-CV-00324-jdp), ECF No.
293; see also Scott Bauer & Todd Richmond, In Wisconsin, DMV Workers Give Bad Information
on Voter IDs, PBS (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:49 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/in-wisconsin-
dmv-workers-give-bad-information-on-voter-ids/; Smith, supra note 127.
238. Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016).The court also found that
Virginia’s voter ID law did not violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Id. at 607.
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photo ID; or (3) any valid employee photo ID.239 A voter without proper ID
may still cast a provisional ballot, which must be cured within three days.240
To cure a provisional ballot, a voter must present valid ID to the local regis-
trar either in person or by fax or email.241 Virginians can obtain a free voter
ID without presenting any independent documentation; the “statute simply
requires that a registrant provide her name, address, birthdate, and social
security number and sign the registration form swearing that the informa-
tion provided is true and correct.”242
The court considered the Arlington Heights factors243 and concluded
that Virginia’s voter ID law, unlike North Carolina’s voter ID law, was not
enacted with a discriminatory purpose and thus did not violate the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.244 For each factor, the court reached the
following conclusions: (1) though there is history of discrimination in Vir-
ginia, there is “a trajectory toward greater inclusion”;245 (2) though the de-
bates were occurring when certiorari had been granted in Shelby, the
legislature acted as if the law would be reviewed under Section 5 of the
VRA as Shelby was not yet decided;246 (3) though there was a “substantial
party split” on the vote, the “legislative process . . . was normal”;247 (4) “the
[legislative history] demonstrate[s] support for the bill for reasons other
than vote suppression, such as the prevention of voter fraud and the promo-
tion of public confidence in the voting system”;248 and (5) though African
American and Latino/a voters were “slightly less likely” to have appropriate
ID, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the law had an adverse disparate
impact.249 After reviewing “the totality of the circumstances involved in the
enactment of [the law] in light of Arlington Heights and McCrory,” the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to prove the law was passed with discriminatory purpose.250
The Court also concluded that the law does not have a racially discrim-
inatory effect in violation Section 2 of the VRA because Virginia allows
239. VA. CODE § 24.2-643(B) (2016).
240. VA. CODE § 24.2-653(A) (2016).
241. Id.
242. VA. CODE § 24.2-643(B) (2016); see also Lee, 843 F.3d at 600 (quoting Lee v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, 188 F. Supp. 3d 577 (E.D.Va. 2016)).
243. The factors are: (1) the historical background of the challenged law, (2) the specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged law, (3) departures from normal procedural se-
quence, (4) the legislative history, and (5) the disproportionate racial impact of the challenged
decision. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–268.
244. Lee, 843 F.3d at 604.
245. Id. at 597.
246. Id. at 601.
247. Id. at 603.
248. Id. at 602.
249. Id. at 598.
250. Lee, 843 F.3d at 604.
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everyone to vote,251 and provides free photo IDs to people without them,
therefore giving every voter an equal opportunity to vote.252 The court de-
termined that, to prove a Section 2 violation, plaintiffs must establish that a
structure or practice denies or abridges the right to vote on account of race
or color in such a way that the political process is not equally open to the
protected class. That is, “its members have less opportunity than others to
participate in the process and elect representatives of their choice.”253 The
court agreed with the district court’s finding that “African Americans, as a
demographic block, are by a slim statistical margin less likely to have a
form of valid identification.”254 The court relied on Crawford’s holding that
“the minor inconvenience of going to the registrar’s office to obtain an ID
does not impose a substantial burden.”255 The court stated that the “es-
sence” of a burdensome structure or practice that violates Section 2 is “its
interaction with social and historical conditions” that causes inequality in
electoral opportunity, but the court did not evaluate the social and historical
conditions that causes inequality in Virginia.256
Finally, the court, relying heavily on Crawford, found that Virginia’s
voter ID law does not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as it does
not place an undue burden on the right to vote.257 The court articulated the
Anderson-Burdick standard,258 recognizing that it weighs the burden on eli-
gible voters unable to obtain ID against the “precise” interests stated by the
Virginia legislature.259 After summarizing the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Crawford, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Virginia’s
voter ID law imposes an even lighter burden on obtaining the free ID be-
cause there is no requirement to present any birth certificate or other docu-
mentation.260 As the “precise” justifications of the Virginia legislature
mimic exactly the “precise” justification in Crawford, the court concluded a
251. “Being able to vote,” according to the court, includes both casting a ballot that is counted
without further action being taken and casting a provisional ballot that will not be counted unless a
person returns within three days to the DMV with proper ID. Id. at 600.
252. Id. at 601.
253. Id. at 599 (citing Voting Rights Act § 2).
254. Id. at 600.
255. Id. (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (plurality
opinion)).
256. Lee, 843 F.3d at 600 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1983)).
257. Id. at 607.
258. “A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ Under this standard, the rigor-
ousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citations omitted).
259. Lee, 843 F.3d at 606–607.
260. Id. at 606.
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fortiori that the law does not impose an unconstitutional burden on the right
to vote.261
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE COURTS’ ANALYSES
A. Successes and Shortcomings of the Analytical Frameworks
1. Discriminatory Purpose Analysis
Discriminatory purpose claims for voter ID laws can be brought under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, or Section 2 of the
VRA, all of which use the same analytical rubric. Courts typically consider
the five non-exhaustive factors originally set out in Arlington Heights262:
(1) the historical background of the challenged law, (2) the specific se-
quence of events leading up to the challenge of the law, (3) departures from
normal procedural sequence, (4) the legislative history, and (5) the dispro-
portionate racial impact of the challenged decision.263 Discriminatory intent
only needs to be a “motivating factor.”264 Should the plaintiffs establish
race to be a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate
that the law would have been enacted regardless of the bad intent on the
part of some in the legislature.265 Plaintiffs brought discriminatory intent
claims in each case outlined above: McCrory, where the court found the
voter ID law was enacted with discriminatory intent;266 Veasey, where the
court could not affirm the lower court’s finding of discriminatory purpose,
due to the lower court’s reliance on infirm evidence, but which still re-
manded it to the district court to reanalyze the claim as there was enough
evidence to find discriminatory purpose;267 One Wisconsin Institute, where
the court did not find the voter ID provision was enacted with discrimina-
tory intent, but found other provisions of the law were enacted with dis-
criminatory intent;268 and Lee, where the court found the law was not
enacted with discriminatory purpose.269
The most difficult factors for plaintiffs to fully capitalize on are the
first factor (the historical background of the challenged decision) and the
fourth factor (legislative history). Addressing the first factor, the historical
background of the challenged decision in the certain states has proven to be
a double-edged sword. States like North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia were
subject to Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA and had been since the VRA was
enacted in 1965. Thus, from 1965 to 2013, when Shelby was decided, North
261. Id. at 607.
262. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
263. Id. at 266–267.
264. Id. at 265–266.
265. Id. at 270–271 n.21.
266. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219.
267. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 234–243.
268. One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d 896 at 918–922.
269. Lee, 843 F.3d at 604.
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Carolina, Texas, and Virginia could not enact any voting law changes with-
out first receiving approval from the U.S. Attorney General or the District
Court of the District of Columbia. This meant that, for those states, there
was little official discriminatory history for the past fifty years.
A court could decide to look at the history one of two ways: either the
court could find that the historical background in the state indicates that
racial discrimination was such an issue that the factor weighs in favor of
finding intentional discrimination,270 or the court could find that since there
was no recent historical evidence of racial discrimination, the factor weighs
in favor of not finding intentional discrimination.271 Likewise, a court re-
viewing the law of states that were never covered by Sections 4 and 5 of the
VRA could find that because the state was never covered by Sections 4 and
5, there must not be racial discrimination in the state.
The fourth factor, legislative history, is a difficult factor to effectively
utilize since today, most legislators do not openly espouse their racial
prejudices and their desire to suppress the voting rights of minorities on
record. Even if such sentiments were expressed, oftentimes, no minutes
were taken272 and compelling testimony would be difficult as legislators
frequently are afforded privilege.273 Should a legislator not announce her
racist views or her desire to suppress votes but instead express a desire to
suppress votes of reliable Democratic voters, plaintiffs could potentially
make a separate Fourteenth Amendment claim under Romer v. Evans.274
Finally, it is imperative that plaintiffs make a discriminatory intent
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and either the Fifteenth Amend-
ment or Section 2 of the VRA. Though the analyses are essentially the
same, when challenging under the Fifteenth Amendment or Section 2 of the
VRA, one must consider an important factor not included in the Fourteenth
Amendment analysis: racial polarization.275 Though racial polarization
standing alone does not evince racial discrimination, it does provide an in-
centive for intentional discrimination.276 “[I]ntentionally targeting a particu-
lar race’s access to the franchise because its members vote for a particular
270. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 223 (“Failure to so recognize [pre-1965 history] would risk al-
lowing that troubled history to ‘pick[ ] up where it left off in 1965’ to the detriment of African
American voters in North Carolina.”) (citation omitted).
271. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 232 (finding that the district court erred in relying on pre-1965 state
history of racial discrimination—“In light of [Shelby and McCleskey v. Kemp], the most relevant
‘historical’ evidence is relatively recent history, not long-past history.”).
272. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 488–89
(M.D.N.C. 2016), rev’d sub nom. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204
(4th Cir. 2016) (finding that although no minutes were taken, the plaintiffs included emails from
Republican staffers and legislators demonstrating that “certain members of the legislature re-
quested and received demographic data for ‘provisional and one-stop voters.’”).
273. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
274. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
275. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 221.
276. Id. at 222.
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party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose.”277 This
factor will allow courts to more closely consider the fact that voter ID law
support splits along partisan lines,278 which weakens the credibility of Re-
publican-led legislatures that advance the purported rationales.
2. Discriminatory Effect Analysis
Most courts have recognized that Section 2 of the VRA discrimina-
tory-effect claims challenging voter ID laws are vote-denial claims.279 To
prove discriminatory effect in a vote-denial claim under Section 2, a plain-
tiff must show—under the totality of the circumstances—that: (1)  “the
challenged standard, practice, or procedure imposes a discriminatory bur-
den on members of a protected class” and (2) “that burden must be in part
caused by or linked to social and historical conditions that have or currently
produce discrimination against members of the protected class.”280 To de-
termine whether there is a sufficient causal link between disparate burden
imposed by state voting law and social and historical conditions produced
by that discrimination, courts typically consider the non-exclusive Gingles
factors.281 In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the voter
ID law had a discriminatory effect;282 the district court in One Wisconsin
Institute found that the voter ID law did not have a discriminatory effect but
other voting restrictions did;283 and in Lee, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found the voter ID law did not have a discriminatory effect.284
The Section 2 discriminatory-effect claim is the claim with which a
plaintiff is most likely to win when challenging a voter ID law because
discriminatory effect is much easier to prove than discriminatory intent and
because undue burden claims have been significantly weakened by the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Crawford, wherein the Court found that the require-
ments of obtaining an ID is not an undue burden. Furthermore, the Gingles
factors force courts to look at the bigger picture—they force courts to ac-
277. Id.
278. William D. Hicks, Seth C. McKee & Daniel A. Smith, The Determinants of State Legis-
lator Support for Restrictive Voter ID Laws, 16 STATE POL. & POL’Y 411, 411 (2016) (finding that
beyond the significant effect of party affiliation, there is a “notable relationship between the racial
composition of a member’s district, region, and electoral competition and the likelihood that a
state lawmaker supports a voter ID bill. Democratic lawmakers representing substantial black
district populations are more opposed to restrictive voter ID laws, whereas Republican legislators
with substantial black district populations are more supportive.”).
279. See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 244; League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224,
239 (4th Cir. 2014); One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d 896; but see Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744,
745 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
280. League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240 (citations omitted); see also Veasey, 830 F.3d
at 244.
281. See Gingles Factors, supra note 25.
282. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 265.
283. One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 958–960.
284. Lee, 843 F.3d at 598. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address this argument
in McCrory.
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knowledge that, for example, “racial disparities in education, employment,
housing, and transportation” affect minority voters right to vote.285 The fac-
tors force a court to look to a state’s overt and subtle attempts to reinforce
systemic racial exclusion and consider the tenuousness of the policy under-
lying the law.286
Weaknesses in this analysis still exist, however, mainly due to the dif-
ficulty in statistically proving how many people were prevented from vot-
ing or had to surmount unreasonable obstacles to vote, as well as the
difficulty in disproving the existence of voter fraud. Here, the plaintiff
should rely on the studies conducted by election experts, including Justin
Levitt, who found thirty-one incidences of voter fraud in 1 billion votes cast
between 2000 and mid-2014,287 and Shelley de Alth, who analyzed the
change in nationwide voter turnout between 2002 and 2006 and found that
voter ID laws decreased turnout by between 1.6 and 2.2% (3 million to 4.5
million voters).288 Additionally, plaintiffs need to keep the focus on statisti-
cal disparities in ID rates, not solely on whether voters were actually denied
the right to vote due to the law.
3. Undue Burden Analysis
The undue burden analysis, as applied to a state election law challenge,
applies the Anderson-Burdick standard, which weighs the nature and sever-
ity of the burden placed on eligible voters who cannot comply with the
provision’s new requirements against the state’s “precise” justifications for
the provision.289 Unfortunately, the strength of such a challenge was signifi-
cantly weakened by the Supreme Court’s application of the standard in
Crawford,290 where the Court found that Indiana’s justifications for the law,
despite no evidence of in-person voter fraud in Indiana or that such laws
would instill voter confidence, were reasonable and nondiscriminatory,291
which means that instead of strict scrutiny, the court applies a “sliding
scale” inquiry, which in actuality is a glorified rational basis inquiry.292
Crawford was, unquestionably, incorrectly decided: the Court only gave a
285. See Gingles Factors, supra note 25.
286. Id.
287. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible
Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-voter-
impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/?utm_
term=.Ce6b784302ce; see also Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, supra note 76.
288. Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID Laws on
Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 186 (2009).
289. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
290. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion).
291. Id. at 194–198.
292. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (stating that when “a state election law provision imposes only
‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
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cursory examination of the state’s rationales as it determined the burden
was “limited.” The Court seemed to exclusively rely on the poorly devel-
oped record of people actually denied the right to vote and did not consider
the fact that, regardless of less-than-compelling “real word impact” testi-
mony, 43,000 Indianans lack required ID.293 If the Court actually weighed
the impact of 43,000 Indiana residents lacking ID who now faced extra
obstacles to voting against the weakly supported rationale, the undue bur-
den analysis would clearly prevent the implementation of the law or at least
significant portions thereof. Instead, the Court has concluded that so long as
there is a neutral, nondiscriminatory rationale, i.e., the prevention of voter
fraud,  the Anderson-Burdick standard is satisfied.
Incorrectly decided or not, lower courts are required to follow Su-
preme Court rulings, but even so, lower courts will likely continue to incor-
rectly analogize Crawford by misplacing reliance on the sentence from
Crawford’s plurality, which states that “the inconvenience of making a trip
to the [Department of Motor Vehicles], gathering the required documents,
and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden
on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual
burdens of voting.”294 The undue burden analysis was addressed in One
Wisconsin Institute in which the claim succeeded295 and Lee in which the
claim failed.296 Lower courts are likely to continue to incorrectly rely on
Crawford by: (1) failing to recognize that Crawford was a facial chal-
lenge,297 which leaves open room for distinguishing as-applied challenges;
(2) ignoring the sliding scale nature of the Anderson-Burdick standard and
instead treating it as an either/or—either the burden is “severe” and the law
faces strict scrutiny, or it is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory reason that es-
sentially undergoes a rational-basis review;298 and (3) failing to realize that
voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restric-
tions.’”) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)) (some citations omitted).
293. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 187–88.
294. Id. at 198.
295. One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 904, 949–950 (finding that, because the purported
justifications for these laws do not justify the burdens they impose, the state may not enforce: (1)
most of the state-imposed limitations on the time and location for in-person absentee voting save
in one circumstance; (2) the requirement that “dorm lists” include citizenship information; (3) the
twenty-eight-day durational residency requirement; (4) the prohibition on distributing absentee
ballots by fax or email; (5) the bar on using expired student IDs; and (6) Wisconsin’s free ID
process).
296. Lee, 843 F.3d at 606–607 (finding that as the Virginia voter ID law imposes even lighter
burdens on one’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights than the Indiana law did in Crawford—
“particularly inasmuch as Virginia voters are not required to present any birth certificate or other
documentation to obtain a free ID”—and the justifications were exactly the same as the Indiana
law, the law did not impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote).
297. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188.
298. Unlike One Wisconsin Institute, in which the district court weighed the burden that each
provision imposed, the findings ranged from a “slight burden,” to a “moderate” to a “severe” (and
finding that the justifications of the state legislature cannot justify any provision with a moderate
or severe burden). One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 929–951.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 37 16-APR-18 8:05
2018] DISENFRANCHISEMENT 2.0 243
if a law’s safety nets (typically in the form of “free IDs”) inadequately
protect the burdened population’s voting rights, the burden must be consid-
ered severe and face strict scrutiny (which a voter ID law cannot
survive).299
B. Lessons from and Implications of the Voter ID Cases
1. Lessons from the Voter ID Cases
A few general lessons can be taken from the cases in North Carolina,
Texas, Wisconsin, and Virginia. First, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling in McCrory—that North Carolina’s voter ID law was enacted with
discriminatory intent—is an anomaly because the facts presented in Mc-
Crory were a jarring aberration from all other cases. In no other case did the
legislature ask for, receive, or rely on racial voter data to eliminate voting
mechanisms disproportionately used by African Americans.300 Nor did any
other state explain that early voting was cut to make sure only one Sunday
was in the period, not just because they wanted uniformity in voting center
hours, but also because “‘[c]ounties with Sunday voting in 2014 were dis-
proportionately black’ and ‘disproportionately Democratic.’”301 The out-
landishness of the facts of this case are starkly contrasted by the results of
Lee, also decided in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the court
determined that not only was the Virginia voter ID law not enacted with
discriminatory intent, but also that it did not have a discriminatory effect,
nor did it place an undue burden on the right to vote.302 In fact, the overt
invidiousness of the facts in McCrory may have hurt the plaintiffs’ discrim-
inatory intent claim in Lee as the court, in distinguishing the cases, seemed
to have set the bar with McCrory: anything not quite as egregious does not
qualify as discriminatory intent.303 McCrory will likely influence how state
legislatures rely on data when making election-law decisions, which will be
discussed in greater detail below.
Second, plaintiffs need inscrutable statistics to be explained by multi-
ple experts and they need to compel witnesses to testify as to the “real-
world impact” of the law. For example, the plaintiffs in Lee put on exten-
sive evidence to show discriminatory intent by having experts explain that
most voter ID laws were passed by Republican legislatures (as was the case
in Virginia), minority voters overwhelmingly vote for Democrats, and mi-
nority voters and young voters were more likely to lack proper ID.304 The
state’s experts criticized and poked holes in the plaintiffs’ experts’ findings,
299. See id. at 903–904.
300. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 230.
301. Id. at 226.
302. Lee, 843 F.3d at 592.
303. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 233.
304. Lee, 843 F.3d at 597.
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which the district court judge found persuasive.305 Ultimately the parties
agreed on the statistic that 96.8% of Caucasians and 94.6% of African
Americans had appropriate IDs.306 The fact that the parties stipulated to a
superficial statistic and the fact that the district court judge ultimately found
plaintiffs’ witnesses unpersuasive307 led the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to conclude that, not only was there no evidence of discriminatory
intent, but there also was no evidence of a discriminatory effect, effectively
dismissing two of the three claims.308
Plaintiffs must ensure a court relies on the correct statistics, as in Vea-
sey, where the plaintiffs focused on the statistical disparity in ID rates, not
on whether voters were actually denied the right to vote because, under the
Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, it is not just voter denial
that is prohibited, but also voter abridgment.309 Plaintiffs must remain fo-
cused on statistical disparity and should limit time spent seeking out citi-
zens who were actually denied their right to vote for two reasons: first, even
several dozen people testifying about vote denial does not carry the weight
of statistics, which can be extrapolated to determine an estimated number of
denied voters; second, it forces the plaintiffs into a position of waiting for
actual harm to occur rather than allowing them to effectively attack the law
facially before it goes into effect.
Additionally, plaintiffs need to outmatch the statistical evidence of the
state’s expert(s) by not only outnumbering the state’s expert, but also by
presenting robust statistical analyses that support the same conclusion: that
racial minorities were disproportionately adversely affected by the voter ID
law.310 The court in Veasey was simply unpersuaded by the state’s experts’
own analysis in light of the plaintiffs’ experts’ use of three types of analyses
coming to a vastly different result.311  This is an expensive but necessary
process to ensure that a court finds a voter ID law has a discriminatory
effect and to bring the court closer to finding discriminatory intent.
A final way in which voter ID opponents should use statistics is to
send statistical data to all legislators in a state legislature considering a
voter ID law (or better yet, testify before the state legislatures about these
statistics). Should a lawsuit arise challenging the law, the court would be
hard pressed to find more compelling evidence than proof that state legisla-
tors who passed the law received statistical data showing that voter ID laws
are racially discriminatory.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 597–598.
307. Id. at 597.
308. Id. at 598.
309. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 253.
310. See id. at 250–252.
311. Id.
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Finally, if a plaintiff wants to challenge the constitutionality of a
state’s voter ID law, the plaintiff should challenge all the provisions that
make up the voting restriction law, not just the voter ID portion. This seems
obvious, but plaintiffs in Lee and Veasey only challenged the voter ID
laws312 and did not include the states’ new restrictions on third-party regis-
tration, which is a way in which many racial minorities register.313 Whereas
the plaintiffs in McCrory and One Wisconsin Institute challenged the voter
ID laws and challenged limitations on early voting, out-of-precinct voting,
and weekend voting, among other provisions.314 This proved to be impor-
tant in One Wisconsin Institute, in which discriminatory effect was not
found for the voter ID law, but was found for: the limitation of in-person
absentee voting to one location per municipality, the narrowing of the win-
dow for in-person absentee voting, and the prohibition on extended week-
end voting hours.315
When challenging multiple provisions, it forces the courts to consider
the full range of discriminatory effects instead of focusing solely on the
voter ID portion of the law. For example, in McCrory, the court found dis-
criminatory intent because all of the voting restriction provisions—requir-
ing state-issued ID, eliminating out-of-precinct voting, eliminating
preregistration, and limiting early voting—only disproportionately affected
African Americans.316 If the plaintiffs in McCrory had only challenged the
voter ID provision, perhaps such a finding could not have been made even
in light of the legislature looking at racial data, because requiring an ID
alone does not show that the legislature relied on that data.
2. Implications of the Voter ID Cases
The outcomes of the recent voter ID cases are inconsistent, but as leg-
islators, judges, civil-rights groups, and citizens digest the results, there are
a few likely consequences of the decisions. First, and most obviously, state
legislatures will not rely on racial data when designing new voting-restric-
tion laws as that was a deciding factor in finding the North Carolina voter
ID law was unconstitutional. However, it is in the Democratic legislators’
best interests to gather such racial data to arm themselves with counterargu-
ments when a voting restriction bill is introduced. This allows civil-rights
groups combatting the law in later litigation to introduce the legislative his-
tory as evidence that the Republican lawmakers knew of the racially dis-
312. Lee, 843 F.3d at 592; Veasey, 830 F.3d at 225.
313. New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, https://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/analysis/New_Voting_Restrictions.pdf (last updated May 10, 2017).
314. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219; One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 905–907.
315. One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 958–960.
316. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 230.
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criminatory effects and still went ahead in enacting the law.317
Unfortunately, reliance on racial data may no longer be necessary in light of
the fact that these opinions carefully combed through the effects of the
laws—savvy legislators will already be aware of McCrory and the research
finding that black and minority citizens are more likely to lack state-issued
ID, use preregistration, or use early voting; thus, these legislators will avoid
discussing these effects on the record to minimize the evidence of the dis-
criminatory intent of the law.318
Second, even without reliance on actual data, legislators will likely
continue to enact voter-restriction laws in a way that greatly affects low-
income voters who are disproportionately minorities. Courts have disap-
proved of actual direct costs to obtaining proper ID,319 but have largely
ignored indirect costs (such as traveling, taking off work, etc). Thus, legis-
lators will likely try to limit voting hours and limit the number of polling
areas to disproportionately affect people who have less flexible work hours
and lack personal transportation.
Furthermore, there will likely be a rise in the “free ID” option in voter
ID laws, as this safety net will more likely allow otherwise strict and un-
yielding voter ID laws to withstand judicial scrutiny.320 Civil-rights groups
should be sure to separately challenge any free ID provision of a voter ID
law as a poor safety net. For example, the district court found in One Wis-
consin Institute that the free ID safety net was ineffectively and discrimina-
torily used and thus found that the law could not stand without major
revisions.321
Third, Republican legislators will continue to use the rationales of
preventing voter fraud and upholding election integrity to support the laws.
So long as a court does not find discriminatory intent, the voter fraud and
election integrity rationales have held up surprisingly well despite judges
openly questioning the judgment of the legislators. This kind of overt mis-
information may become more prevalent in the so-called “post-truth” era of
American politics.322 Legislators who oppose the laws must attack these
rationales and attempt to get proponents to concede flaws or alter their ar-
317. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 236–237. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be a factor
that weighs in favor of finding the law was enacted with discriminatory intent.
318. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216–218.
319. If direct costs are imposed, civil rights groups should consider raising a Twenty-Fourth
Amendment argument and contend that such costs are a poll tax. See Ellis, supra note 4, at
1037–38.
320. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion).
321. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1037–38.
322. See cf. Eric Oliver & Thomas Wood, A New Poll Shows 52% of Republicans Actually
Think Trump Won the Popular Vote, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/18/a-new-poll-shows-an-astonishing-52-of-republicans-
think-trump-won-the-popular-vote/?utm_term=.0373ed99b685.
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guments as the rationales are challenged or disproven.323 Civil-rights
groups and the news media must continuously combat the misinformation
spread by voter ID proponents by explicitly noting and condemning the
racist motives behind these actors’ rhetoric. Too long have Republican leg-
islatures been able to use dog-whistles to gain the support of discontented
poor whites, and these racist overtures should be labeled as such. The dan-
gerousness of the rhetoric has seeped into the Crawford opinion, in which
Justice Stevens stated that “the inconvenience of making a trip to the [de-
partment of motor vehicles], gathering the required documents, and posing
for a photograph” is not a substantial burden,324 implicitly approving of
Republican’s claims that those who don’t stand in voter registration lines
are “lazy” and thus unworthy of participating in democracy.325 Crawford’s
holding is not infallible, as it is a plurality opinion, and thus will be easier to
have the Supreme Court overturn it. Regardless of this fact, voter ID oppo-
nents are unlikely to win by solely attacking the baseless rationales of voter
ID laws.  Democratic lawmakers are already finding ways to combat the
effects of the voter ID laws, such as automatic voter registration laws.326
CONCLUSION
Voter ID laws make up one part of the structural disenfranchisement
that prevents minority voters from fully exercising their constitutionally
guaranteed right to vote. The increase of the power of the minority vote in
recent years has led to a wave of voter ID laws enacted by panicked Repub-
lican legislators. The proffered rationales of these laws is the prevention of
voter fraud and the protection of the integrity of elections; however, they
allow lawmakers to suppress the votes of minorities, who overwhelmingly
vote Democrat, without overtly doing so on the basis of race. Due in part to
the Supreme Court’s flippant disregard of systemic racism in the election
process, the laws are succeeding in spite of their baseless rationales. Despite
this, lower courts remain skeptical of the dubious rationales; thus, civil-
rights groups should capitalize on the discriminatory effect analyses.
Successfully proving that there is discriminatory effect will signifi-
cantly dismantle or void the laws entirely and will take these groups one
step closer to having the courts find that the laws were enacted with dis-
323. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 240–241. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be a factor
that weighs in favor of finding the law was enacted with discriminatory intent.
324. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198.
325. Ellis, supra note 81, at 910 (citing Pennsylvania Republican Condemns ‘Lazy’ Americans
without Voter ID, MSNBC (Sept. 20, 2012, 12:13 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-
show/pennsylvania-republican-condemns-lazy; David Weigel, GOP Precinct Chairman Says
Voter ID Will Hurt “Lazy Blacks,” Then Resigns, SLATE (Oct. 25, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/10/25/gop_precinct_chairman_says_voter_id_will_hurt_lazy_
blacks_then_resigns.html).
326. Automatic Voter Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration.
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criminatory purpose. A finding of discriminatory purpose will allow courts
to openly proclaim that the rationales are pretextual, which will eventually
undermine the use of the rationales by other state legislatures.
